Burn the forest!: A bargaining theoretic analysis of a seemingly perverse proposal to protect the rainforest by Mohr, Ernst
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Mohr, Ernst
Working Paper
Burn the forest!: A bargaining theoretic analysis of a
seemingly perverse proposal to protect the rainforest
Kiel Working Papers, No. 447
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Mohr, Ernst (1990) : Burn the forest!: A bargaining theoretic analysis of
a seemingly perverse proposal to protect the rainforest, Kiel Working Papers, No. 447, http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/46968Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Kiel Working Paper No. 447
BURN THE FOREST!:
A BARGAINING THEORETIC ANALYSIS
OF A SEEMINGLY PERVERSE PROPOSAL
TO PROTECT THE RAINFOREST
by Ernst. Mohr*
NovembeK1990
Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
The Kiel Institute of World Economics
ISSN 0342-0787Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft
Dusternbrooker Weg 120
2300 Kiel 1
Kiel Working Paper No. 447
BURN THE FOREST!:
A BARGAINING THEORETIC ANALYSIS
OF A SEEMINGLY PERVERSE PROPOSAL
TO PROTECT THE RAINFOREST
by Ernst. Mohr*
NovembeKl990
*I am grateful to Bert Hofman, Stefan Sinn and participants of a Kiel
Institute staff seminar for very valuable comments on an earlier version
of this paper.
Paper prepared for the Symposium on "Conflicts and Cooperation in
Managing Environmental Resources", November 15-16, 1990, Freuden-
berg, FRG, sponsered by the Volkswagen-Stiftung.
The author himself, not the Kiel Institute of World Economics, is solely
responsible for the contents and distribution of each Kiel Working Paper.I. Introduction
Consider a country possessing a specific production factor in fixed
quantity, producing in combination with land a stream of services
through time. Some of these services are consumed domestically. The
bulk of it, however, is consumed world-wide.
Despite the services the country provides to the world it does not
earn any income from these exports. This is because it lacks a technol-
ogy turning services produced into the exclusive property of the
country. Possessing a sector which produces such a good, how can the
country earn income from the services it provides?
This is a stylised description of the problem faced by countries
which host the world's rainforests. As determinants of the global climate
rainforests provide a multitude of environmental services. Some of these
services escape the home countries of forests, spill over abroad and are
consumed there as a free lunch. In this sense, countries do not possess
exclusive property rights over the forests they host. This global com-
monality of a national production factor creates a series of problems
which endangers the environment.
Viewing the rainforests as part of national wealth one must expect
that they are substantially undervalued by host countries compared to
their global fundamental as the present value of their foreign services is
nil. Hence, with given opportunity costs for the land which hosts the
trees there is, from a global perspective, an insufficient incentive in
these countries to preserve their environmental resources.
Financial compensation for the international services the rainforests
provide or foreign aid to pay for their protection is therefore deemed
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helpful for their preservation. Here, however, arises another problem.
Although a global social planner would internalise all foresteal services,
decisions concerning financial compensation are made from a national
For surveys of the ecological importance of rainforests see e.g.
GUPPY [1984] and SIOLI [1987].
For a survey of policy options see AMELUNG [1989]. A theoretical
justification of financial compensation is e.g. given in RAUSCHER
[1989].point of view in the recipient countries of foresteal services, trying to
preserve the status quo of a free lunch.
In this situation, how can the host countries of the forests extract
resources from the recipient countries of their services; and what deter-
mines the magnitude of these transfers which ultimately may contribute
to the preservation of the forests?
This paper entertains the view that such transfers are the result of
negotiations between countries hosting rainforests and recipient countries
of foresteal services. Applying the strategic bargaining approach to
negotiations (RUBINSTEIN [1982]) the paper investigates the determi-
nants of a bargaining solution and the incentives as well as the oppor-
tunities of the countries hosting rainforests to strike a better deal. The
strategic role of soft vs. hard development is analysed and it is shown
that host countries may have an incentive to commit to environmentally
"too" wasteful development. The environment, however, ultimately may
benefit from this commitment as it helps extract more resources from the
recipients of foresteal services.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section II the bargaining model
is developed. Section III analyses a basic bargaining situation and Sec-
tion IV investigates the fundamental change in bargaining power which
arises if countries obtain the technology to profitably develop the land
hosting the forests. Section V investigates the incentive and opportuni-
ties of countries to improve on the negotiated transfer income. Sec-
tion VI concludes the paper.
II. The Bargaining Model
Consider the two country bargaining game depicted in Diagram 1.
At time t=0, country A hosting a rainforest, Amazonia, say, makes a
proposal to country B, the recipient of foresteal services, concerning
the division of a cake which is defined by country B's benefit from
foresteal services. If country B does not accept A's offer it can
It is a modified version of the bargaining model in SUTTON [1986].terminate negotiations and take an outside option which gives A a share
e. and B share eR of the cake under negotiation. However, rejecting
A's offer B may continue bargaining by making a counter-offer in period
t=l. Country A then can accept B's offer, or terminate negotiations by
taking the outside option e. (implying e~ for B) or it can continue
bargaining in the following period. The bargaining game continues until












Time costs of bargaining may occur because counter-offers can only
be made after one period has elapsed. Let this be represented by a
discount factor h, and hu.., 0<h. , h^l, for country A and country B
respectively.
Following the strategic approach to bargaining, a negotiated division
of the cake at stake must be an equilibrium point of the game in exten-
sive form, defined by the bargaining rules depicted in Diagram 1. Let
m be the equilibrium share of the cake country A receives. It is shown
in the Appendix that m is given by(1) m (l-hB)/(l-hA-hB) if
(2) m 1-h -(1-e ) B A if -
eA>
(3) m otherwise.
The division of the cake, m, being a perfect equilibrium ensures
that a party's threat to leave the bargaining table and take the outside
option does only influence the outcome of negotiations if such a threat is
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credible. The outcome hence differs as to whose outside option poses a
credible threat. This is represented by equations (l)-(3). Equation (1)
gives the equilibrium division of the cake if neither party possesses a
credible outside option. If only country A has a credible outside option
available, then the equilibrium partition is given by equation (2). And
equation (3) represents the case where (only or in addition to country
A) country B possesses a credible outside option.
This bargaining game will be applied in the following sections to
different stylised representations of the conflicting interests between
countries hosting rainforests and countries receiving their services. As a
frame of reference from which to depart towards the analysis of more
complicated cases we first analyse a bargaining situation which is par-
ticularly simple.
An outside option of a party is credible if and only if taking this
option gives the party a payoff which is at least as high as the
payoff it receives if it would not take this option.III. Mock-Bargaining: The Case of the Good Old Days
To fix ideas, suppose in an initial situation country B receives a
constant stream of foresteal services, the period value in money terms of
which is V. Suppose country A now initiates negotiations to extract some
fraction of the cake V from country B.
Ceteris paribus, the process of bargaining does not affect the com-
monality property of the rainforest, i. e. it continues to provide country
B with services valued at V. This implies that country B has no time
costs of bargaining, that is
(4) hB =
For hR=l the equilibrium partition, equations (l)-(3), simplifies to
(5) m = 0 if -
e <0 A
eB<l,
(6) m = e. if
V°
For hR=l country B is indifferent between making a deal worth
(1-m) today or tomorrow. If during negotiations country B receives
V as a free lunch it in fact prefers to reach an agreement involving
transfer-payments rather later than ealier. This would have to be
represented by setting h-r,>l. This "play on time" game would
potentially further improve the bargaining power of country B. The
equilibrium partition m, derived from the "patience" game hj^l must
therefore be interpreted as a limiting case, indicating the maximum
country A can obtain from a "play on time" game involving h^ £ 1.(7) m = 1-e otherwise.
If country A possesses no alternative opportunity to use its land
besides hosting the rainforest, e.=0. Furthermore, in this case e,-.=l, as
a breakdown of negotiations retains the status quo for country B of a
free lunch worth V.
It is straightforward from our intuition and from equations (5)-(7)
that in this case the equilibrium partition is given by m=0. The country
exporting foresteal services is unable to obtain a share of the recipient
country's value of these services. The reason simply is that it has no
bargaining power whatsoever if services continue to dissipate abroad as
ever before during negotiations and if it cannot obstruct this flow after
negotiations have broken down.
This bargaining situation may be viewed as a good approximation to
the situation Central African, South Asian or South American countries
would have been in when trying to strike a deal on their foresteal
services before they possessed the resources to put their land to an
alternative use. The model highlights the fundamental change that has
occurred since those countries have obtained the ability to develop their
rainforests. This change is not represented by an emerging necessity of
the recipient countries of foresteal services to negotiate for the pro-
tection of rainforests. Rather it is the newly obtained ability of host
countries to rainforests to strike a deal on the distribution of the bene-
fits which accrue to the world from their forests' services. We will
investigate this in the remainder of this paper.
6 Similarly, in FERNANDEZ and ROSENTHAL [1988], in applying the
strategic bargaining approach to sovereign debt reschedulings, it is
presumed that the debtor country continues to service debt during
debt renegotiations to the maximum of what lenders can expect.
Furthermore, the debtor country has no credible outside option
available. It is shown that in a bargaining equilibrium creditors reap
the entire cake under negotiation. It is intuitively clear that this
must be the outcome as lenders are in the best conceivable state of
the world whatever happens.IV. Bargaining in the Face of Development
Suppose country A has available a project of developing the rain-
forest. Let II be the period profit from undertaking the project. Suppose
the period profit of the project is an increasing, concave function of the
resources P, allocated per period to the project. Undertaking the project
requires some destruction of the rainforest. This depletion of environ-
mental resources causes environmental costs per period D. in country A
A
and D~ abroad. The magnitude of these costs depends on the environ-
mental safeguards applied. Let the period costs of safeguards accruing
to the country developing the rainforest be S. Let DR=DR(S), with
6DD/as<o, a^/as^o, and let D =D.(S), with aD./as<o, a
2D./as
2>o.
D D A. A. A A
The magnitude of environmental safeguards, S, may be viewed as
representing the degree of "softness" of development. Soft development
reduces the environmental costs associated with the project for both the
country hosting the rainforest and the world. Soft development, how-
ever, requires the input of national resources by the country under-
taking the project. Given total resources Y of size Y=Y, the budget con-
straint for country A is Y=P+S. ,
The optimal environmental safeguard, S , for country A, ignoring
the positive global externalities satisfies
(8) -an/ap - 3D /as = o
A






and the project would be undertaken with safeguards S if
n(S
A)-D.(S
A)>0. Let this be the case.
G A global social planner would choose safeguards, S , satisfying
do) - a n/ap - 3D./as - aD_/as = o.
A D9
If both the global and the national social planner had the same amount of
resources, Y, available for development and environmental protection




implying the standard result that a public good is undersupplied if the
social planner does not internalise all the positive externalities associated
with the consumption of the good.
Furthermore, upon total differentiation of condition (8) and from
condition (9) it immediately follows that
(12) dS
A/dY > 0.
Bargaining over the distribution of the recipient country's benefit
from foresteal services in the face of above development project differs
markedly from mock-bargaining.
As the project destructs some of the forest and hence reduces the
benefit of the recipient country from foresteal services, the size of the
cake under negotiations is given by V-d-DR(S) where
'-{5}
if as a result from negotiations the project is
[undertaken with safeguards S
[abandoned
Note that the view underlying the definition of the cake of size
V-D~(S) denies that the project as such is necessarily at stake during
negotiations. Rather, the perhaps more realistic view is entertained here
that countries hosting rainforests may be able to proceed with their
development programs after an agreement. However, what may be in-
fluenced in this case by the prospect, the process or the result of10
negotiations are the environmental safeguards the country is prepared to
apply when undertaking development.
Development at varying degrees of softness in anticipation of or in
response to different outcomes of negotiations can influence the relative
bargaining power of the parties involved. In particular, the host country
now has available an outside option of positive value to which it can take
recourse if an agreement would be "too" disadvantageous for it.
If country A upsets negotiations by terminating bargaining before
having reached an agreement it can proceed with the project. Further-
more, in this case it is optimal for the country to allocate the optimal
amount S of its resources of size Y for environmental safeguards.




If negotiations break down and development is undertaken with
safeguards S then country B obtains a benefit from foresteal services
equal to V-DR(S ). If under an agreement country A applies environ-
mental safeguards equal to S if the project is undertaken, then the
recipient country's outside option is given by
(14) e_ = [V-D_(S
A)]/[V-d-D_(S)].
CD D
Hence country A's choice of environmental safeguards in case an agree-
ment on the implementation of the project is reached influences country
B's gains from a breakdown of negotiations and hence its inclination to
give leeway during negotiations. In particular, country B's direct gains
from foresteal services under an agreement involving the implementation
of the project exceed those under a breakdown of negotiations if S>S .
Hence for S>S country B is willing to accept some payments to country
A even if country A undertakes the project.
The magnitude of environmental diligence applied to development
when an agreement is reached depends on country A's ability to commit
to certain environmental safeguards. If commitment is infeasible then a
promise by country A to undertake safeguards different from the safe-11
guards which satisfy the optimality condition (8) is incredible. In this
case it is rational for country B to expect that after the agreement is
reached country A will undertake development with safeguards satisfying
condition (8).
no However, the optimal safeguards under non-commitment, S , under-
taken after an agreement has been reached exceed the safeguards, S ,
undertaken after a breakdown if under the agreement country A receives
some transfer payments, M, from country B. This is because transfer
payments increase the resources of the country hosting the forest from
Y=Y to Y=Y+M. Replacing S
A by S
n
C and Y by Y in condition (12) it
follows that these additional resources are partly used to finance a
somewhat softer development.
The situation is different if country A can commit itself before
entering negotiations to the application of certain environmental safe-
guards after an agreement has been reached. In this case the size of the
cake under negotiations is under control of country A by a commitment
to safeguards S=S . A commitment to softer development for the time
after a negotiated agreement on the implementation of the project has
been reached increases the size of the cake and hence the transfer
payments received for any given positive equilibrium share m. Hence for
a given share m of the cake of variable size the host country now faces
a trade-off between securing a higher project income through hard
development and a higher bargained income from providing fores teal
services through soft development.
To see that a commitment option gives an incentive to softer develop-
ment under an agreement on the implementation of the project note that
disposable resources are given by Y=Y+M, where the transfer income is
given by M=m'[V-DR(S )] and where S satisfies the optimality condition
d5) - an/ap-6D_/as
c- an/ap - aD/as
c = o.
o A
As the first term in condition (15) is positive it follows from a com-





where S is replaced by S in condition (8).
The equilibrium partition m is now easily determined from equations
(5)-(7). The central difference to mock-bargaining is that country A's
outside option, equation (13), is now positive. Hence the equilibrium
partition is given by equations (6) or (7) depending on which party's
outside option is credible. Replacing e. and eR in (6) and (7) by equa-
tions (13) and (14) and noting that country A's transfer income from the









where S=S or S=S , depending whether commitment is possible or not.
The equilibrium transfer (17) is easily interpreted. D_(S )-d-D1->(S)
is the net environmental loss in money terms for country B from lost
foresteal services due to a breakdown of negotiations, or vice versa the
net environmental gain from reaching an agreement. Hence, country A is
able to negotiate a transfer income up to the minimum of country B's net
environmental gains from the agreement and its own net total project
A A
income, I1(S )-D.(S ), in case an agreement would not be reached.
Straightforwardly, country B is never prepared to accept transfers
in excess of its own net environmental loss in case of a breakdown.
Likewise, country A cannot extract transfers in excess of the net project
value in case of a breakdown because for as long as negotiations con-
tinue the project is kept on hold. Which of these two constraints deter-
mines the equilibrium depends on which of them is the binding one.
If A's outside option is credible it receives a transfer income making
A A
it indifferent between the bargaining solution I1(S )-D.(S ) and taking
its outside option. This then requires that in exchange for receiving the
equilibrium service income country A sacks the project. Hence the world
continues to receive foresteal services worth V, however, at the price
A A
I1(S )-D. (S ). Transfer payments ensure the survival of paradise.
However, under a bargaining solution the project need not be can-
celled. If B's net environmental damage from a breakdown of negotia-Bibliofhek
4m fmstifrufs fur Weltwirfechoft
tions, D~(S )-d'DB(S), is smaller than A's non-cooperative project ~
) ) value, I1(S )-D. (S ), then it is too expensive for B to bribe A out of
the project. In this case the project is undertaken with safeguards S
and d=l. Country B accepts transfer payments, Dr>(S )-DR(S), making
it indifferent between the agreement implying the project be undertaken
under cooperative safeguards S and non-cooperative safeguards S . The
total gain to country A from the bargaining enterprise then is given by
I1(S)-DA(S)+DB(S )-Dg(S). Whether this gain exceeds the non-cooper-
ative project value depends on whether the country chooses safeguards
in excess of S or not.
If commitment is possible then country A's negotiated transfer income
from the provision of foresteal services is strictly positive even if the
project is undertaken. This follows from the equilibrium transfer (17),
condition (16), 6DR/6S<0 and the fact that the non-commitment optimum
must satisfy S >S . Hence the option of commitment to different
degrees of softness in developing the rainforests provides a country with
a technology to extract some of the world's benefits from foresteal
services provided.
The equilibrium safeguards, S , exceed the non-cooperative safe-
guards S . This has the consequence of reaching an agreement which
involves transfer payments to the country hosting the rainforest. In this
precise sense, international payments for the services provided by the
rainforests contribute to the protection of these environmental resources.
If commitment is infeasible matters are a bit more complicated. In
no this case the equilibrium safeguards S must be a fixpoint
no no
S =Z[Y(S )], being itself the optimal safeguards Z(Y) in reaction to
some given total income Y=Y+M and reproducing this income as a bar-
no
gaining equilibrium Y(S ).




A, in which case Y=Y, and
•
c> =t> is indeed optimal. Hence the autarky equilibrium level of safe-
guards may result from bargaining if the country hosting a rainforest is
unable to commit to an environmental protection program when developing
the forest.
However, there may exist additional fixpoints with the property
S >S . In such an equilibrium a country hosting a rainforest can
extract some of the foreign gains from the forest's services because14
other countries anticipate that some of their transfer payments are
invested into the protection of the forest. In this precise sense, inter-
national payments can contribute to the protection of the rainforests.
V. The Incentive to Commit to Environmentally Wasteful Development
The previous analysis suggests that environmental gains for the
recipient country of foresteal services from a negotiated solution may
provide the host country of forests with some transfer income. A natural
question for such a country then is what it can do in order to increase
this transfer income. In fact, in above analysis commitment to a softer
development in case an agreement on the implementation of the project is
reached provided a technology to reap and increase such transfers.
However, this need not be a country's sole instrument. A commitment
to particularly environmentally wasteful development in case an agreement
is not reached may instead or in addition increase a host country's share
in the cake under negotiation. Surprisingly, such a commitment to waste-
ful development may in fact contribute to the protection of the forests.
To see this, consider the equilibrium transfer (17). An environmen-
tally wasteful development of the rainforest in case the parties fail to
reach an agreement would be a commitment to safeguards S , where S
w w A.
is replaced by S in (17) and where S <S .
If country A's outside option is credible then from (17)
w w y^
M=I1(S )-D.(S ). As S maximises the development gains net of national
environmental costs it is optimal for the country to set S =S in order
to maximise the transfer income. Hence in this case the country does not
have an incentive to commit to wasteful development. This is depicted in
Diagram 2a.
However, this is no longer the case if the value of country B's




W<0. Hence, a commitment to
A safeguards below the unilaterally optimal safeguards S increases the
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The optimal commitment to environmentally wasteful development is
depicted in Diagram 2b. There is an incentive for the country to reduce
environmental safeguards to S^ where country B's net environmental
benefit from reaching an agreement is equal to country A's net project
profit in case the parties fail to reach an agreement. For S =S 1 both
countries are indifferent between the agreement and the non-cooperative
solution. A further reduction in committed safeguards would make
country A's outside option become the credible threat. This would link
the equilibrium transfer to the value of country A's outside option. A
commitment to safeguards below S1 in Diagram 2b would therefore be
suboptimal.
Commitment to environmentally wasteful development when negotia-
tions fail can increase the transfer income from providing the world with
foresteal services. These excessively high environmental costs are,
however, avoided if an agreement is reached. More so, this prospective
environmental feeding of the hogs contributes in fact to an additional
protection of the rainforests when the project is undertaken. This
follows immediately from total differentiation of the optimality condition
(15), from which we obtain dS
C/dM>0 if S
C in fact is a maximum. The16
opportunity to commit to wasteful development when negotiations fail
creates an incentive to commit to softer development when negotiations
succeed. In this sense, a commitment to burning the forest helps protect
the environment.
Even if the country can only commit itself to safeguards for the
situation when negotiations fail but not when they succeed, the environ-
ment may benefit from this adverse incentive. This case may represent a
country which can create a situation in which it cannot prevent a kind
of "wildcat development" of the rainforest by private parties if negotia-
tions fail, although this would be in the domestic interest once negotia-
tions have broken down. In this case, if there exists a bargaining
equilibrium S , where S >S , it follows from replacing Y by Y and S
by S in (12) that this commitment to wasteful development gives an
incentive to apply tighter environmental safeguards after an agreement
has been reached.
VI. Conclusions
This paper entertained the view that profitable but environmentally
costly development projects give countries hosting rainforests an oppor
tunity to repatriate some of the benefits the forests' services provide to
the world for free. It has been shown that these countries may have an
incentive to commit themselves to a particularly damaging development
program should negotiations about the distribution of the global benefits,
accruing from the rainforests, fail. Such a commitment to environmental
apocalypse need not be damaging to the environment as it creates an
incentive to apply greater environmental safeguards to development when
negotiations succeed. In this sense, haggling on the back of nature need
not be at nature's costs.17
Append ix
If m denotes the supremum of the share of the cake under negotia-
tion which country A can reap in a negotiated settlement in period 2,
say, then, by backward induction, the shares country A and country B



































Solving the first row in Box 1 for m, we obtain the share country A
receives in a subgame perfect bargaining equilibrium. It is given by
equations (l)-(3) in the main body of the paper.18
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